The Karabakh issue in ‘no war, no peace’ situation: Dilemma

If Azerbaijan publicly declared that it accepts the updated ‘Madrid Principles’ it means that those principles are not favorable for Armenia. It means that the foreign policy of Armenia is losing ground or Karabakh is being given back. These kinds of opinions started to circulate when the Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan declared that the newly adopted ‘Madrid Principles’ are acceptable for it.

The opinions are faulty for several reasons.

Firstly, Azerbaijan declared that it accepted the proposed ‘Madrid principles ‘already two years ago. It means that the newly adopted versions of the principle may hardly contain anything unusual.

Secondly, Azerbaijan could later on announce that it was not in favor of the principles which it had earlier accepted anyway. We have such an experience in the past and the announcement about the agreement remains to be an announcement. If all announcements came to be true then the conflict would have been solved long time ago.

Thirdly, the announcements of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs have its goal of keeping the Armenian society in uncertainty. The idea behind such statetments is based on the expectations that the stable situation in home politics will be used by the political circles and the relations of authorities versus society will deteriorate. This statement therefore has an equivalence of the informational weapon for the society and it is used by Azerbaijan for this purpose.

The same situation applies to the protocols signed between Armenia and Turkey when the Prime Minister of Turkey Erdogan said that he would sign the protocols. The public doubts in Armenia were immediately stirred up. If Turkey welcomed this fact, it meant that the process was not favourable for Armenia. Thereafter we saw that Turkey gradually started to back down on its own welcomed and signed protocols.

Fourthly, the Madrid principles are not favorable for Armenia in any of their versions since there is a point about the return of the liberated territories to Azerbaijan there. It means that no matter if Azerbaijan agrees to them or not, the agreement is not favorable for Armenia, Karabakh and Diaspora anyway.

Fifthly, even if the Madrid principles do not meet the basic interest of Armenia, they stay only as basic principles around which the negotiations should advance. It means that the international community or Azerbaijan can propose some concessions, but they can be equally rejected by the Armenian party.

There is a different question why are such proposals made to Armenia? There have always been the proposals about the return of the territories and withdrawing of the troops in the circle of the co-chairs since the beginning of the negotiations. Those proposals were present there during the presidencies of both Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Robert Kocharyan. Every new authority indirectly inherits the main obligations and the negotiations experience of the previous authorities. Thus, the very experience of Levon Ter-Petrosyan was transferred to Robert Kocharyan and then to Serj Sargsyan.

No matter how much are the principles reformulated and actualized, they are essentially the same. Only if the military elite makes the changes in the government, it is possible that the principles can change in general too (in which case positive and negatives changes will certainly follow under such circumstances).

This or other way it is the reality today. The intermittently made proposals can always be rejected by the Armenian side. If the rejection of the proposals was carried out by Karabakh until the end of the 90s, the same was done by Armenia after that. Armenia can also reject an unfavorable proposal at any time now. Moreover, if we consider the fact there is always a possibility for the return of the Karabakh side into the negotiation process then we will have the opportunity of double rejection.

Why did Karabakh come out of the negotiation process if the participation of Karabakh would maintain the conditions twice as strong before the situation reached the stage of such concessions? It is this reason why the former authorities are blamed for leaving Karabakh outside the process of the conflict settlement.

At the first glance, the situation bear negative effects as it is the Armenian side that agreed to leave the Karabakh outside the negotiations process and thus to participate both on its own behalf and on behalf of the Karabakh side.

However, the coming out of the negotiation process of the Karabakh has a positive impact as well that was probably taken into consideration by the foreign policy of Robert Kocharyan. While coming out of the negotiations, the Karabakh remains the factor of the ‘reserve voice’. If, for example, Armenia is demanded to make concessions with regards to the Karabakh settlement, Karabakh can always ‘become more active’ and come to rescue of Armenia by rejecting the proposed documents. Thus, the Karabakh involvement may undermine any agreed proposals. This means that Armenia acquired an additional right to a voice.

Since the clause about the withdrawal of Armenian forces and the return of the liberated territories was there already back in 1990s, which as we mentioned, was inherited from authorities who were in power earlier, the Karabakh presence in the process of negotiations would not be more favorable than its coming out of the process.

But our objective should not be tied with the position of rejection. ‘No war, no peace’ situation is more dangerous than a real threat of war which is more predictable and definite.

The idea that the nowadays situation of ‘no war, no peace’ is crucial for Armenia in the process of the settlement of Karabakh conflict and fraught with consequences does not bring entirely exclusive conclusion either.  The conflicting sides have not reached any agreement today which means that in the near future there will hardly be wrong to expect any breakthrough. However, considering the volatility of the developments in the region, it is important and useful to observe all the possible scenarios.

The strategy of the critics of the Armenian foreign policy is the following: if the proposed principles do not meet the requirements of the Armenian interests, it means that the government has led an incorrect policy, thus, it is necessary to come out of the process and adopt a tougher stance thereby beginning all from afresh. The radical opposition makes the situation more acute, and with not offering an alternative strategy still claims the necessity to ‘come out of the negotiations in order not to lose Karabakh and a part of Armenia’.

While these open and closed discussions in Armenia continue, Azerbaijan makes 2 billion large expenditures for strengthening its armed forces and threatens Karabakh. The threat of commencing military actions (which is the opposite of the political will to reach the settlement) Azerbaijan accompanies with the publically declared stance of being in favor of the settlement by peaceful means and via negations.

Thus, Azerbaijan appears to be unpredictable, and Armenia, having its own firm interests, must be able to stay in control of the behavior and subsequent steps of the adversary. The conduct of Armenia in the eyes of the international community is gaining a clear shape and this is especially true with regards to the states that are mediators in the process of the negotiations. The latter ones evaluate the conducts of the sides and propose one or other principle as well as judge in favor of one or other side.

In this case, a dilemma of drivers is being created now for Azerbaijan and Armenia. It is the case when two drivers positioned their vehicles against each other and they do not know in which direction to move.

If one of them moves straight then it is possible that the opponent will move in the same direction too, and they will collide. If one of them moves to the right then it is possible that the other one will move to the left, and they will collide. The same applies if one turns to the left. The best option is if both swerve to different sides and manage to pass each other. However, this option is as much possible as all others ones.

Both sides consequently experience difficulties of making a choice in which they can benefit from the situation.

It is important for Armenia not enter into the situation of collision and to choose a smoother road, and with this, diminish the dividends of Azerbaijan and gain a more favorable stance in the eyes of the mediators.

To be continued